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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its
ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
CHARLES W. TAGGART, Trustee, a
partnership, First Security Bank of Utah,
a Utah Corporation, and Zions First National Bank, a Utah Corporation, Mortgagees,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.
10594

BRIEF OF APPELLANT PARTNERSHIP
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
At the outset, counsel for Defendant asks the Court's
indulgence for the length of this Brief. It quite exceeds the
average in size. But the enormity of this case and the questions raised in this Appeal have dictated the need for added
length of the Brief, at least if the issues urged are to be
given their rightful attention.
The questions of fact at trial were prodigious both in
number and scope. Entailed was the examination and the
evaluation, under two different sets of conditions, of a tract
of land in a vital urban area that was 10 city blocks long
and 15 city blocks wide. It was tantamount to the trial of
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two dozen or more land condemnation suits at once, involving every basic land use known excepting agriculture. In
pure number of issues and land value conclusions, it is no
doubt the largest condemnation suit ever tried in Utah.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a suit in condemnation brought by the Respondent Road Commission in July, 1965, to expropriate
land of the Defendant-partnership for the development of
sections of Interstate Highway 215 and 2100 South Expressway between 2100 South and 3100 South in Salt
Lake County.
Jurisdictional questions relating to the right of the
State to condemn Appellant's land, public use and necessity of the "taking," and the requirement that the project
design be consistent with the greatest public good and the
least private injury, were not placed in dispute, and the
case proceeded to trial by jury on the amount to be paid
as Just Compensation for the 78 db acres condemned and for
the damages accruing to the remaining properties by reason of the partial-expropriation, the highway severance
and the construction of the project as contemplated.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The issues of Just Compensation were tried to a jury
before the District Court of Salt Lake County in January,
1966. On January 22, the trial Court entered judgment, based on special interrogatories returned by the
jury, for $359,877.00. (R. 98-99) Defendant-landowner
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filed a timely motion for additur and new trial in the alternative, and for new trial alone (R. 107-109), which motions, upon hearing, were denied by the lower Court. (R.
131) From the judgment of January 22, Defendant appeals on issues of law. (R. 133,137,138)
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
It is urged by Defendant in this Appeal that the judgment of the lower Court be reversed and that the case be
remanded for new trial on the issues of Just Compensation.
MAP OF SUBJECT PROPERTY AND TAKING
Attached as Appendix 6 is a replica of trial Exhibit
1, representative of the prominent characteristics of the
property and the freeway "taking". In general, the base
plat depicts the property and its surroundings as existent
in July, 1965, prior to condemnation. The total property is
shown in yellow, the irregular black lines within the total
tract being indicative of water and drainage courses serving the land, a power line right-of-way running north,
southeast and east, and in the southeast section, an area
formerly known as Decker Lake. Major roadways which
served the land are colored brown.
The property condemned and the freeway alignment
as it cuts through the total tract, are set out on clear
plastic which overlays the base map. The non-access rightof-way lines, center line, and mushrooming interchange at
the north are shown in the "taking" area.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The evidence and expert testimony on Just Compensation in the case were focused on two considerations:
1.

The highest and best use and fair market value
of the total property BEFORE the "taking" by the
Government of the 78zb acres, as of the date of
service of summons, July 12,1965;

2.

The highest and best use and fair market value
of the Defendant's remaining property AFTER
the "taking" of the 78±: acres, weighing the nature and affect of the "taking," of the severance
created and of the construction and establishment of the highway project.

Consequently, this Statement will be addressed to those
factors.
1.

Total Property BEFORE the "Taking"

The property condemned by the Respondent was in
July, 1965, part of a larger unified and integrated tract
of 927 ± acres located immediately west of Redwood Road
(1700 West) and extending west to about 3200 West between 2100 South and 3100 South in Salt Lake County.
(Ex. 1, Tr. 255-257) At the date of value, it was owned
or being purchased by the Defendant, TAGGART TRUSTEE, a partnership of businessmen and lawyers. (Tr. 55-58)
The land lay as undeveloped acreage. Such condition existed not because of a lack in demand for industrial, residential and commercial uses for the property, but because
the former owner, prior to 1962, had not attempted any
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development, and because the present Defendant-landowner,
after 1962, had been stalled in its development plans due
to the imminency of the freeway project through the middle
of the tract. (Tr. 49-51)
The total ownership commanded <\n area of in city
blocks north to south, touching on the north the largest
industrial center in Salt Lake City, and on the south, southwest and east, developed residential subdivisions. (Ex. D-l,
P - l l , Tr. 142, 258, 411-415) With highway frontage of
2400 feet on 2100 South Street, 2750 feet on Redwood
Road and better than 2700 feet on 3100 South Street (all
said frontage with full and open access) (Tr. 142, 146-147,
256, 426), with water, sewer, gas, and power immediately
available on the property (overlay Ex. D-lA, Tr. 255),
with zoning which permitted industrial, commercial and
residential use (Ex. D-18, Tr. 147, 414), and with a genuine demand and need for immmediate development of the
subject property (Tr. 48, 147-153, 412-415, 257), it was
the informed judgment of the three experts, C. FRANCIS
SOLOMON, WERNER KIEPE, and MAXWELL LOLL,
called as witnesses by Defendant-landowner that the highest and best use of the whole property, prior to condemnation, was:
tlle north one-third (233± acres) . . . industrial with
direct access from 2100 South and Redwood
Road;
some 40 acres having 1,600 feet of Redwood Road
frontage zoned C-2 . . . a commercial center with
direct access from Redwood Road;
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the balance of 532 ± acres at the center and soutn . .
residential with access from Redwood Road, 2100
South and 3100 South. (Tr. 90-92, 152-154, 257259,266-268,271-275,425-427,429-432)
To compliment these findings, Leon Frehner, noted land
planner in Utah, testified for the Defendant as to a feasible
plan for the development of the property for the three
uses, and there was received in evidence a plan (Ex. D-4)
showing a plausible development for the entire property.
(Tr. 154, 267-268, 275, 426)
The appraisers, FLETCHER and JOHNS, for the
State, were in basic agreement with the landowner's
experts as to the highest and best use of the property prior
to condemnation. (Tr. 623, 770-771)
The employment of the total property as an integrated
unit of land, for the varied uses of industrial, commercial
and housing, rested upon several conditions:
Access to Industrial . . . the industrial land in the
north one-third was heavily dependent upon its
direct access from 2100 South and to a lesser
degree, a secondary access from Redwood Road.
(Tr. 146-147, 256-257, 418) FRANCIS SOLOMON
testified that proper planning of the industrial
portion required the main entrance be established
on 2100 South with a series of interior roads
fanning out inside the property, as illustrated by
the Frehner Plan. (Tr. 257, 271) Mr. KIEPE
stated that the dual access from 2100 South and
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Redwood gave all the Industrial land the advantages of "circulation" which it did not have without
the 2400 feet of 2100 South access. (Tr. 426-427)
Access to West One-half . . . the development of the
west one-half of the land, industrial on the north
and residential on the south, was conditioned upon
access being maintained from 2100 South and
Redwood Road (Ex. D~4), since traffic movement
and buying interests going to and from the property would be from the north and east. (Tr. 177,
258, 466) There were no public streets on the
west boundary of the land nor did defendant have
access to a street system from its west side so that
if access from the west sections to 2100 South
and Redwood Road were cut-off or obstructed, the
remaining access to those sections would be only
by way of 3100 South, an inferior county road.
(Tr. 178, 179, 467)
Drainage of Decker Lake . . . the pond, covering about
180 acres, had acted as a shallow basin for portions
of the subject property and lands west as tail
water drained to the Jordan River. (Tr. 73, 74)
Although not more than a foot in depth (Tr. 75),
its existence presented a definite problem in development of the 500 plus acres on the southeast
for residential use. ALTON J. SORENSON of
Caldwell, Richards and Sorenson, engineers, testified that since the bottom of the lake was three
to five feet above the surface elevation of the
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Jordan River, the lake was susceptible to being
drained and filled for residential use. (Tr. 78-84)
Fill material was available on the property west
of the lake and east of the power line right-of-way
which could have been graded and compacted in the
pond area. (Tr. 89-91) Although the cost of draining and filling the lake was estimated as
substantial, it was feasible, from both engineering
and economic standpoints, before the "taking,"
because the total 500 acres developed under one
ownership and as a unit, was large enough to
absorb the costs as a part of general land preparation expenses. (Tr. 88, 145-146, 279, 424-425)
The stage was thus set on the property at the time
the State filed its condemnation complaint.
2. Nature and Design of "Taking"
The 78 acre acquisition courses the full breadth of the
property from north to south cutting through the middle
of the industrial and residential land (Ex. 1, Tr. 15, 466468, 473), with the result that the remaining property is
literally broken in two pieces. (Tr. 180, 466-468, 473, 474)
The freeway right-of-way lines, throughout, are designated
as "non-access." (See Appx. 6) The dual effects of
this "non-access" design are not only that the Defendant
is prohibited from access to the freeway from its remaining
lands at all points along the "taking", 1 but also that there
1
The only access which the Defendant-landowners have or will
have to 1-215 upon its completion is that which it will share with
others in common as members of the general public. (Tr. 13, 14, 16)
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is no means or way afforded to the Defendant to cross
the freeway from one side of its remaining property to the
other. (Tr. 16) The blocking of east-west travel on the
property is complete under the freeway design for there
is no interchange or grade separation device permitting
access from west to east within the property for a distance
of 8000 feet. (Tr. 15)
The 2400 feet of frontage of and access to the Defendant's land on 2100 South Street is taken in its entirety.
(Tr. 13, 177, Ex. D-1C)
The width of the freeway "taking" averages 260 feet
through the south, center and north center of the property
(Tr. 8), but increases to a final width of 2400 feet at the
north end. (Tr. 9, Ex. D-l)
As finally constructed, the traveled portions of the
freeway will be elevated on an 8 foot dirt fill, on an average,
(Tr. 18) with the height of the dirt fill gradually increasing
on a 2% grade at both the north and south ends of the
property to an elevation between 22 and 35 feet in order
that the freeway may pass over 2100 South and 3100 South
Streets. (Tr. 7, 18, 19)
3. Remaining Property AFTER

the "Taking"

By reason of the "taking" and the design of the highway project across subject property, the land left to this
Defendant after condemnation was subject to a set of new
conditions which did not previously exist. In determining
the highest and best use and fair market value of the
property remaining after the "taking", the expert witnesses
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called by the landowner, testified that the buyer and seller
in the open market would take stock of the following
factors:
(a) After the "taking", the remnant property consisted of two separated pieces, isolated from each
other. (Tr. 184, 186-188, 319, 473-77) Whereas
before the expropriation, the buyer in the market
had the advantage of developing one unit of ground
for its highest use with the costs of such spread
over the whole property, the severed tracts after
the "taking" were each on its own to develop without the aid of the other or of the whole. (Tr. 186-88,
473-77) From one unified tract of ground, the
highway had created two unhomogenous remainders. (Tr. 177-186, 310-20, 465-80)
(b) Gone were the advantages of the control of access
to and through the total property, gone was the
flexibility in the manner and variations of development, gone was the beneficial influence which
development of the east portion of the ground
would have on the west part, and gone was the
plottage, the uniform shape, and the access characteristics which the property formerly possessed.
(Tr. 176-186, 314-320, 465-479) WERNER KIEPE
was of the opinion that the "'taking" through the
middle of the total property produced a cutting
effect that, in a general way, innured to the dertiment of practically all the remainder land. (Tr.
467)
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(c) For a span of 10 city blocks, the freeway was to be
constructed over Defendant's land without a single
crossing point or underpass. (Tr. 15, 16) Prior to
condemnation, the crossing from the east to the
west parts of the land, or vice-versa, involved
the travel of but a few steps. (Ex. D-l) To
reach the same place after condemnation from a
point on the opposite side of the freeway, travel
exceeding 10,000 feet or 16 city blocks was required
down the length of the property south to 3100
South Street, along that street underneath the
freeway overpass, and back again the length of
the land. (Tr. 15-17)
(d) Industrial Land Remaining East of Freeway. All
access to this property (72.6 acres) from 2100
South Street was lost as a consequence of the
"taking". (Tr. 13, 177, 466, D-1C) Mr. SOLOMON
testified that said property was reduced to reliance on Redwood Road for its access, which
street had not theretofore generated industrial
influence south of 2100 South. (Tr. 312, 344)
It had also been deprived of its probable potential development as part of the larger industrial
tract according to Solomon. (Ex. D-4, Tr. 344-345)
Now situated in a pocket next to the freeway, it
would be dependent for development from the east
instead of from the industrial area of the north.
(Tr. 188, 466, 311-312)
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(e) Industrial Land Remaining West of Freeway. The
loss of access to the industrial land on the east
of the freeway was also occasioned to the 122 ±.
acres of industrial land on the west. Ingress and
egress to that land after condemnation, had to
come from a pole line road (a dead-end dirt road,
the public nature of which was highly questioned),
or from 3100 South Street (some 7 to 8 city blocks
away). (Tr. 177-79, 313, 467, 468) SOLOMON
concluded that the loss of reasonable access, the increased expenses in utility development and a delay
in time in which the property would have otherwise developed, all but "disrupted" the former industrial use concept of this remainder. (Tr. 312315) Additionally, available materials needed to
fill low spots on such property had been "taken"
or isolated by the freeway. (Tr. 314) KIEPE
described the 52 acres in the pocket between the
freeway and the power line on the west as being
"shut-off" from access and development until the
Defendant bought land to the north to reestablish a connection with frontage on 2100 South.
(Tr. 467)
(f) Commercial Acreage East of Freeway. A penetrating analysis of the commercial land fronting
on Redwood Road was made by WERNER KIEPE.
He investigated more comparable commercial sales
data -than all (other expert witnesses for both
sides, combined. (Tr. 447-457, 640, 782) The
commercial value accorded to this 39.8 acres by
KIEPE prior to the "taking" was premised on
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the fact that this parcel was "an ideal location
for a shopping center", to serve the interior residential land of Defendant as well as residential
areas, generally, to the south and west. (Tr. 429,
471, 472) After the "taking" and construction
of the freeway, the accessibility to the commercial
area from lands west of the Belt Route, including
that remaining to Defendant, is "completely shut
off except by a long circuitous road" with the
end result that the shopping center would "lose
most of its potential buyers" from that area,
(Tr. 472, 473)
(g) Residential Land East of Freetvay. The circumstances visited on this remainder (constituting
some 209 acres) were described by Messrs. SOLOMON and KIEPE. SOLOMON stated that because the Belt Route was not planned for construction until 1968, the development of this land
would be delayed, which delay, expressed in loss
of return on the investment to the buyer, would
have a depreciating affect to a 300 foot strip, or
about 45 acres of land paralleling the freeway.
(Tr. 316, 317) Furthermore, because of the proximity to noises, vibrations and odors from freeway traffic, it would be necessary to add an additional 50 feet to the depth of residential plottage.2
2

The witness, Solomon, stated and the testimony in the case is
undisputed that a 50 foot corridor reservation next to a non-access
freeway is standard practice by landowners in the development of
residential land. (Tr. 318) Such a corridor reservation was only
made necessary by the "taking" and construction of the freeway
through Defendant's land. (Tr. 315, L. 28-30)
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(Tr. 315-318) Mr. KIEPE was determined to
the same judgment, i.e., that the residential land
immediately next to the freeway will require additional depth in lot development and is less desirable in the market place by reason of that fact,
after condemnation. (Tr. 478, 479) KIEPE also
found that home site acreage east of the freeway
had also lost materials for grading, filling of
Decker Pond, and contouring, which materials
were in the "taking" or segregated to the west
by the "taking". (Tr. 477)
(h) Residential Land West of Freeway. The factors
of proximity to the freeway and the requirements
of added depth appurtenant to the residential
land east, was as well extant on the west of the
"taking". (Ex. D-9 Solomon, D-10 Kiepe, Tr.
317, 476-479) Several other depreciating factors
were also present. A strip of land, approximating
26 acres, was caught between the west non-access
line and the east edge of the power line right-ofway. (See Appx. 6, Ex. D-l) Prior to condemnation, the 26 acres was part of the integrated
west-center section of the total tract. After condemnation, it is left as an isolated tract. Beginning on the north at a perpendicular tangent to
Highway Station 458±, this severed strip gradually narrows in width until reaching a point
tangent to Station 420-415, it is only a few feet
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wide. (Tr. 318-319) SOLOMON and KIEPE described the pinched sections as "almost useless"
and damaged to the point that "it practically
loses its value". (Tr. 318, 476) As in other areas,
neither witness, FLETCHER or JOHNS, for the
State found any severance damage whatsoever,
to this 26 acre area. (Ex. P-12, P-14) The residential land west of the freeway (about 146
acres) is, because of the "taking", physically and
circumstantially divorced from its former environment and access to and from the east. Loll
said that because of condemnation, such property
had lost its "doorway" to the east for development of utilities and access. (Tr. 184) FRANCIS
SOLOMON concluded that the acreage, having
lost its east-west access, had sustained a set back
in the time of development amounting to 6.67%
of the former property value. Mr. Kiepe summed up the matter:
"A. We now have a definite division. Formerly, we had nearly 500 acres which was in
one plot, which could be developed and it meant
a uniformity of planning of roads and so forth
which could be — which would allow for a
much better development. Now, this part will
have to be developed separately. That is the
west part will have to be developed separately
from the east part. There can not be any continuity there." (Tr. 474-475)
(i) Sewer and Water. In the development of the separated tracts west and east of the freeway after
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condemnation, the costs of installing sewer and
water underneath the highway right-of-way is
measurably increased as against the expense incident to development of the integrated property
before the "taking". (Tr. 94-96)
Each of the witnesses, SOLOMON, KIEPE, and LOLL,
called by Defendant, translated the foregoing factors (a)
through (i) into that price which the willing buyer would
pay the willing seller for the remainder property after
condemnation. (Ex. D-6, D-9, D-10) Expressed in severance damage and apart from the value of the "taking",
they individually concluded that the buyer will pay less
to the seller for the remaining property after condemnation
than would have been paid for the same property before
condemnation, as follows:
Solomon

$251,711.00

Kiepe

$309,120.00

Loll

$315,415.00

4. Land Value Witnesses for the State. The condemnor's
first witness, R. S. FLETCHER, gave testimony that there
was absolutely no severance damage to the remaining propperty as a result of the "taking" and the construction of
the non-access freeway through the Defendant's property.
(Ex. P-14, Tr. 666) On cross-examination, he admitted:
that he had made no investigation as
feasibility in draining and filling
although it is a factor as to which
seller ought to be informed; (Tr.

to the cost or
Decker Pond,
the buyer and
702-708)
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that the costs of draining and filling could have been
averaged over the total residential acreage before
the "taking" as against the inability to do so
because of physical separation after condemnation; (Tr. 710)
that he knew of no other property nor had he appraised any other property in Salt Lake County
wherein a non-access freeway had cut through
a total property for 10 city blocks with no place
to get from one side of the remainder to the
other; (Tr. 712)
that if the highway "taking" had permitted full access
to the landowner from one side to the other of
his remaining property, his appraisal of severance damage would have been the same as it was
here. IN OTHER WORDS, HE FOUND NO
SEVERANCE DAMAGE TO THE REMNANT
PARCELS IN ITS TOTAL LOSS OF EASTWEST ACCESS FOR A DISTANCE OF 8,000
LINEAR FEET; (Tr. 712-714)
that there was no damage to the remaining industrial
land either west or east of the freeway, although
it had lost 2400 feet of frontage and access on
2100 South, although it had lost its flexibility
for development, although one piece was left as
an isolated 4 acre tract, and although better than
140 acres west of the freeway would have to depend upon access, if at all, by a pole line road;
(Tr. 721-726)
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that there was no severance damage to the industrial
land remaining on the west side, even though 46
acres of it would, admittedly, be "possibly" delayed a year in development because of the "taking". (Tr. 727) A delay of one year in loss of
interest on the investment to the buyer in the
market was calculated by the witness to be $13,800.00; (Tr. 727)
that the narrow strip of land in the residential section
physically severed between the west freeway nonaccess line and the power line was worth just as
much "after" as it was "before", although the
piece tapers to a single point on the south tip
where for several hundred feet, its width is less
than 25 feet; (Tr. 731)
that so far as severance damage is concerned, he did
not give any consideration to the time in which
the freeway would be built in determining whether
the remainder lands had been delayed in development by the manner and time of highway construction. (Tr. 732)
Fletcher was evasive and unresponsive on cross-examination and the trial Court found it necessary to admonish
him on several occasions:
"You are not an advocate and you are a witness
and your responsibility is to answer the question
as simply as you can." (Tr. 698)
"Mr. Fletcher, I don't know why you are reluctant to answer questions. You ought to answer
the questions as put to you in fairness. You ought
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to answer yes or no not to presume to begin a discussion of something else. Do you understand?
(Tr. 756)
A.B.C. JOHNS, JR. was the condemnor's last value witness. His opinion of market value, both "before" and
"after" condemnation, was substantially less than that of
other witnesses, the other government witness, Fletcher,
included. (Ex. P-12, P-14, D-6, D-9, D-10) JOHNS' value
of the total tract before the "taking" was $441,029.00 less
than FLETCHER, $560,885.00 less than the market value
determined by FRANCIS SOLOMON, and $1,007,329.00
less than the judgment of WERNER KIEPE. (Ibid.) The
segments of JOHNS' testimony significant to this Appeal
are:
under his opinion, the best of Defendant's land prior
to the "take" was that at the extreme north having
direct access to 2100 South Street. It had a value
of $4,000 per acre by his testimony. Only 6 9 ±
of 233 industrial acres was given that value;
(Tr. 800)
the witness admitted that the remaining property had
suffered in the loss of all access of 2100 South
Street by the closing of east-west access throughout the remainder land and by its increased
dependency for ingress and egress upon Redwood
Road on the west and the pole line road on the
east, all of which JOHNS acknowledged would be
important considerations to the buyer and seller
in the market. (Tr. 830-832) But he opined that
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there was no diminution in value to any of the
remainder lands attributable to those factors,
with the exception of 25 acres; (Tr. 813-814)
even if the condemnor had constructed underpasses
on the property allowing east-west travel under
the freeway instead of the total blocking of such
travel as actually established, the remaining property would have the same market value under
either design in JOHNS' view of things; (Tr. 856)
he admitted that Decker Lake area would be much the
more difficult to develop after the "taking" because there was less land with which to work and
over which to spread the costs, and further admitted that the buyer and seller would count it
as a detriment to the "after" value of the remainder, but he didn't "reflect it" in his "after"
opinion; (Tr. 838)
JOHNS found no depreciation in the value of the residential grounds remaining, east or west of the
freeway, although he too acknowledged that such
remainders must develop as separate units, that 26
acres on the west was pressed between the freeway and the power line, and that the west area,
generally, was now dependent on a new neighborhood to the south; (Tr. 854-855)
the witness allowed that the lone damage to remainder
properties caused by the "taking" was restricted
to 25 acres of $4,000 industrial land. (Tr. 813)
Reason for the depreciation — loss of access to
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2100 South. The damage amounted to 40%; (Tr.
813, Ex. P-12)
the other remainder industrial lands immediately abutting on the damaged 25 acres sustained the idential loss of 2100 South Street access, it was conceded by JOHNS, but he conceded no severance
damage to any part of the same; (Tr. 851-854)
59% of the witness' severance damage was promptly
erased when he disclosed that in his view, the
same 25 acres which he had damaged $1,700 per
acre, along with an additional 21 ± acres west of
the "taking", had been specially benefitted $575
per acre in the total sum of $26,582.00. (Tr. 815)
The basis claimed for the benefits was the location of the 1-215 freeway interchange at 2100
South Street. JOHNS said on direct examination
that he considered sales of other lands similarly
benefitted (Tr. 816), but he could not on crossexamination relate one such transaction; (Tr. 864,
865)
JOHNS admitted to changing his original appraisal
before trial to include the $26,582.00 special benefits. Before that, his appraisal had not included
any special benefits whatsoever. (Tr. 862)
5. Cross-examination of JOHArS on Condas Property. On
cross-examination, the condemnor's witness, JOHNS, admitted that he had previously appraised in behalf of a landowner, the "Condas property" next door to the subject prop-
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erty on the north and east. It had been acquired for highway purposes also. (Tr. 828, 842) The Condas piece had access on 2100 South Street and Redwood Road as did the
subject property, and was zoned industrial M-l as was the
industrial land of defendant. (Tr. 828) Counsel for Defendant proceeded to ask JOHNS whether, in fact, he had
in the past "appraised the Condas piece for the landowner
for $10,000 per acre." (Tr. 843) The objection by State's
counsel on the ground of immateriality was sustained and
Court advised the jury:
"jury is admonished to disregard the testimony
with respect to the price of the adjoining property
and I might make this explanation, that is, while
inquiry with respect on cross-examination of factors
considered in nearby areas is a proper exercise of
cross, it is the Court's judgment that in this instance that the value of that is out-weighed by the
risks that are involved in introducing other issues
which we do not have the time to resolve.
We are not about to re-try that case or the factors involved there, so, for that reason I ask you
to disregard that testimony and that question completely." (Tr. 843, 844)
The trial judge expressed anxiety about time throughout
the JOHNS' cross-examination. (Tr. 842, 844, 853, 861,
864)
6. Special Benefits to Remainder by JOHNS. On direct
examination, JOHNS said that 46 acres of the industrial
remainder were benefitted specially because of the arterial
interchange and traffic to be established on the freeway
north of the subject land after the "taking". The witness
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did not testify that the highest and best use of the benefitted property was enhanced. (Tr. 815, 864) On cross
examination, counsel for Defendant asked the witness if
it were not true that the traffic which would be placed on
and through the interchange area was the same traffic
that was already passing the subject property on Redwood
Road. (Tr. 864) The State's objection of immateriality
was sustained. (Tr. 864)
7.

Qualifications of Expert

Witnesses

Witnesses for Defendant-landowner:
C. FRANCIS SOLOMON has been a broker and appraiser in Salt Lake City for 37 years. A senior
member of the American Institute of Real Estate
Appraisers (M A I), he was President of the
Utah Chapter, is on its National Board of Governors, was Southwest Regional Conference Director and in 1963, was the National President
of the Institute. He is a member of and has served
as president of Utah Association of Realtors, and
the Society of Residential Appraisers, and is a
member of the American Right of Way Association. He has sub-divided and developed residential
land. He has been a lecturer on real estate at
several Universities in the west and an author
of portion of a manual on Appraisal Techniques
published by Prentice-Hall, Inc. He was designated the first "Realtor of the Year" for Utah in
1961. On constant retainment by the State Road
Commission during the past decade, his clientel
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lists every substantial public agency, federal, state,
county, city, school board, in Utah engaged in land
acquisition, as well as Zions, Walker, First Security, Continental Banks, Pioneer Savings, American and Prudential Savings, all types of insurance companies and mortgage institutions,
churches, oil companies and private individuals.
(Tr. 243-254)
WERNER KIEPE — 28 years a broker and appraiser
in Utah. He is the senior member in Utah and
past chapter president of the American Institute
( M A I ) , qualifying as a member in 1937. With a
degree in Economics and Accounting from the
University of Utah, Mr. Kiepe is professor of the
real estate course of the University under joint
sponsorship with the M A I group. Past president
of the Utah Board of Realtors, he prepared for the
State Tax Commission the tables for the uniform
tax assessment of real property now in use by
that Agency and Salt Lake County. Like Mr.
SOLOMON, the witness has appraised and testified in behalf of the State Road Commission consistently in years past on highway expropriations,
as well as in behalf of every major governmental
agency in the Salt Lake County, all major banks,
churches, mortgage institutions, oil companies and
others. (Tr. 398-409)
Both Messers. SOLOMON AND KIEPE appraised
the lands in the condemnation cases involving
"This is the Place Monument". (Tr. 252, 409)
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MAXWELL LOLL — A broker and appraiser, Loll
has been active in the real estate market since
1946. A member of the American Society of Appraisers ( A S A ) and American Right of Way
Association, he has taken a variety of special
appraisal courses. He has been retained by the
State Road Commission more than any other
single client. Loll had appraised on every section
of interstate highway in Salt Lake County for
the Road Commission, including land immediately
abutting the subject property north and south
on 1-215, and east on the 2100 South Expressway.
Over 60 appraisals had been made for the Road
Commission in 1965, alone, on Salt Lake County
freeways by Mr. Loll. He had also appraised for
other condemnors in Salt Lake County, banks and
private landowners. (Tr. 131-138)
Witnesses for Plaintiff-condemnor:
R. S. FLETCHER — A broker since 1958 and a recent
member of the American Insitute (M A I ) ,
Fletcher has been in the real estate business since
1947. Only recently has he appraised for public
agencys involved in land acquisition. He has appraised for banks, insurance companies and private individuals. (Tr. 603-608)
A. B. C. JOHNS, JR. — A private fee appraiser since
1962, Johns was not and had never been a broker.
A graduate of University of Houston in 1949, he
had been a member of the M I A group for 3
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years. He also was a member of the Society of
Real Estate Appraisers. He had served as an appraiser for the Federal Bureau of Public Roads to
investigate and inspect federal-aid land purchases
made by the State Road Commission in 1962.
He had appraised for one other federal agency,
no other public agencies except the Road Commission, some insurance companies and private
owners. (Tr. 760-764, 882, 823)
8. Acreage Values and Comparable Sales of Witnesses.
The main points of contest on market value before the "taking'', were in the industrial section of the north (233±
acres) and the residential area of the center, southeast and
west (466dz acres) of the total tract. (Exs. D-6, D-9, D10, P-12, P-14; see Appendices 1 thru 5 herein.) In summary, the opinions of the witnesses in those areas were:
Industrial
Per Acre

Residential
Per Acre

Mr. SOLOMON*
Mr. KIEPE*
Mr. LOLL

$5,500-$4,235
$6,500-$4,000
$5,500

$3,500-$2,328
$1,650
$3,000

Mr. FLETCHER*

$6,000-$5,000

$l,500-$200

Mr. JOHNS, JR.*

$4,000-$2,300

$177

Appraiser

Sales of comparable properties utilized by the witnesses for Defendant were probative and the more relevant
to the subject property:**
^Values on the acreage varied depending upon particular location.
**A complete compilation of sales data will be found on Exhibits D-13,
13A, 13B, 13C and P - l l and in the direct examination of each witness.
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Price Per
Acre

Acreage
Size

Date of
Sale

2100 So. 2350 West
(across street from
subject)

126.5

1964

$7,750

Ind-1

2100 So. 2100 West
(across street from
subject)

18

1961

$8,500

Ind-2

2100 So. 1850 West
(across street from
subject)

18

1960

$8,500

Ind-6

2100 So. 2700 West
(across street from
subject)

1965

$5,790

Ind-7

2100 So. 2700 West
36
(immed. west of subject)

1965

$4,000

Res-2

3100 So. 2100 West
12
(immed. west of subject)

1965

$3,500

Res-7

3100 So. Redwood Rd. 16.5
(immed. east of subject)

1963

$2,962

Res-5

250 ft. So. of Subject 13
on 3200 West

1965

$3,460

Sale

Location

Ind-3

2.54

The sales used by State witnesses were, for the most
part, westerly of the subject property, some more than 10
blocks away. (Ex. P - l l ) In all, witnesses for the Defendant produced 27 seperate transactions, and the Plaintiff's
witnesses testified to 18. (Ex. D-13 et al., P - l l )
9. Market Value Opinions of Witnesses. The witness
calculations on market value before and after the "taking"
are lengthy and need not be fully reproduced here. They
are set forth in the Appendices 1-5 of this Brief. In capsule
form they were: (Exs. D-6, D-9, D-10, P-12, P-14)
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For the Defendant-landowner
C. FRANCIS SOLOMON
Value of total tract BEFORE..$3,169,651.00
Value of remainder tract
AFTER
$2,609,766.00
Difference or Just Compensation

$560,000.00

WERNER KIEPE
Value of total tract BEFORE..$3,448,920.00
Value of remainder tract
AFTER
$2,773,750.00
Difference or Just Compensation

$675,170.00

MAXWELL LOLL
Value of total tract BEFORE..$3,516,590.00
Value of remainder tract
AFTER
$2,844,070.00
Difference or Just Compensation
For Plaintiff-condemnor

$672,520.00

R. S. FLETCHER
Value of total tract BEFORE..$2,882,620.00
Value of remainder tract
AFTER
$2,550,500.00
Difference or Just Compensation

$332,120.00

A.B.C. JOHNS, JR.
Value of total tract BEFORE..$2,441,591.00
Value of remainder tract
AFTER
$2,187,914.00
Difference or Just Compensation

$253,677.00
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10. Instructions of Court
The Court by 3 separate Instructions, 18, 19, 30, charged
the jury that the Defendant had the burden of proving the
market value of land "taken" and damages by the preponderance of the evidence. In Instruction 18, it directed that:
"If the evidence introduced by both parties as to
the land taken and damages, if any, to the remaining lands is evenly balanced, then you will reject
the contentions advanced by the Defendants." (Emphasis added.)
Nowhere did the Court charge the jury that its verdict
could be within the range of the total value testimony, if
the preponderance was less than the value conclusions of
the landowner but more than the Government's testimony.
11.

Special Interrogatories

Returned by the Jury

The jury returned into open court the following interrogatories submitted under Instruction No. 30:
1. As of July 12, 1965, what is the fair
market value of the 926.7 acres — before condemnation.
Answer
$2,775,911.00
2. As of July 12, 1965, what is the fair
market value of the remaining 848.59
acres — after condemnation of the
78.11 acres by the State and the construction of the freeway in the manner proposed. This figure should include such benefits, if any, which you
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find the new highway facility may
bring.
Answer
$2,416,034.00
3. The difference between 1 and 2 is the
just compensation to the landowner.
Answer
_..$ 359,877.00
4. What is the fair market value of the
78.11 acres condemned by the State as
of July 12, 1965.
Answer
$ 308,301.00

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
THE DEFENDANT A NEW TRIAL ON THE
BASIS OF INADEQUATE DAMAGES.
The jury interrogatories are against the clear and
manifest weight of the creditable testimony and
are unsupported by the substantial and believable
evidence.
After return of the jury interrogatories and entry of
judgment, Defendant pursuant to Rule 59(a) (5) U.R.C.P.,
moved the lower Court for a new trial or in the alternative,
an additur to the verdict. One of the bases was that the
interrogatories as answered and returned were so grossly
inadequate and openly contrary to the preponderance of
the believable testimony on market value, both before and
after the "taking", that it shocked the basic senses of justice and fairness of the Court, and required a new trial on
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the question of Just Compensation. The trial judge refused
to grant the motion. He was wrong in so doing.
In seeking a new trial on the ground of inadequacy of
the condemnation award, Defendant's counsel is not unmindful of the prevailing rule that this Court will not review the facts of this case de novo, Art. VIII Sec. 9, Utah
Constitution, nor will it set aside a jury verdict and judgment because a simple preponderance of the evidence would
suggest a different solution. Horsley v. Robinson, et al.,
112 Utah 227, 186 P. 2d 592 (1947). The test is whether
in the minds of reasonable men, the award is "obviously"
below "any reasonable appraisal of the damages suffered".
Opinions of Crockett, J. and Henriod, J. in Stamp v. Union
Pacific R. R. Co., 5 U. 2d 397, 303 P. 2d 279 (1956). To be
upheld in law, the verdict and judgment must:
"fall within that orbit so that it can be said that
there is substantial evidence from which reasonable
minds could believe facts which will support it."
(Emphasis ours) Lund V. Phillips Petroleum Company, 10 U. 2d 276, 351 P. 2d 953 (1960).
The principle was applied to actions in eminent domain in
City of Winchester V. Ring, 312 111. 544, 144 N. E. 333
(1924), wherein the Illinois Supreme Court said:
"The rule is that this court will not interfere with
the finding of a jury on the question of damages in
a case of this character unless that finding is clearly
and palpably against the weight of the evidence."
There is good reason for the rule that an appellate
court will set aside a jury award with reluctance. Penman V.
Eimco Corp., 144 Utah 6, 196 P. 2d 984 (1948); Stamp V.
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Union Pacific R. R. Co., supra. But when that award falls
short, as it does in the case at Bar, of any reasonable assessment of compensation for the "taking" and damages
to the remainder, the injustice will be rectified on appeal.
Kentucky Highivay Coram. v. Gilbert, 253 S. W. 2d 264 (Ky.
1952). As declared by this Court in Bodon V. Suhrmann,
8 U. 2d 42, 327 P. 2d 826 (1958) :
"when the verdict is outside the limits of any reasonable appraisal of damages as shown by the evidence, it should not be permitted to stand, and if
the trial court fails to rectify it, we are obliged to
make the correction on appeal."
See also 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain 110, Sec. 17.3 (3rd
Ed.).
Employing these law principles to the rudiments of
the subject case, when consideration is given to the testimony of the believable witnesses on market value, SOLOMON and KIEPE, to the foundation for their appraisals,
to their professional background and experience in making
value judgments of this magnitude, to their ability to perceive the rationale of those elements commonly noticed in
the buying market, and to the overwhelming evidence of
remainder damages under their testimony, when weighed
against the deficiencies of FLETCHER and JOHNS, their
lack of experience, their failure to reflect factors in their
evaluations which they acknowledged time after time
were of vital import to the remainder properties, their almost consistent attitude of ignoring the most conspicuous
elements of severance damages and their lack of candor
on the witness stand, all culminate in the plain conclusion
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in the minds of reasonable men that the award in this matter, under the interrogatories of the jury, is so pitifully inadequate as to transcend and shock the ordinary senses of
justice and common sense. The record of trial herein, puts
the rule in Bodon into effect.
Such conclusion does not depend upon argument of
counsel. The facts and the witnesses provide the answer.
While the expropriation of the 78 acres by the State consumed about 8% of the total tract, it was not that fact
which wrecked havoc to the remaining lands. Rather, it
was the location of the "taking" and the non-access design
of the highway project which brought about the ruination
of the remnant parcels. The right of the citizen to recover
for both elements stems from constitutional and statutory
guarantees. Article I. Sec. 22 Utah Constitution; 78-34-10(2) U.C.A. 1953; State Road Comm. V. Co-op Security
Corp. of LDS Church, 122 Utah 134, 247 P. 2d 269 (1952);
Tanner V. Provo Bench Canal & Irr. Co., 40 Utah 105, 121
Pac. 584 (1911).
The testimony is without dispute that the action of the
Federal Bureau of Roads and the Road Commission in this
case has no practical parallel in the history of Salt Lake
County. For under the Complaint, the "taking" will serve
to construct a non-access elevated freeway through the
heart of 928 acres of industrial and residential land for a
span of 10 city blocks (i.e. from South Temple to Tenth
South) without a solitary crossing for the remaining landowner. Had the "taking" occurred on the far west or ex* treme east of the total property, or had the Plaintiff per-
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mitted or established some way for the Defendant-landowner to get on and off the highway facility, or at least to
cross it at distant intervals, the consequences would not
have been so grievous. But neither happened. Like a hack
saw, the "taking" cuts and tears through the center-axis
of the land creating perpetual severance as it goes, until
reaching the north end, it renders up the very guts of the
property by engulfing all 2400 feet of frontage and access
on 2100 South.
The aftermath of the "taking" is mostly deductive.
The property is forever shorn of its integrity as one unit of
land with the auxiliary advantages of flexible development,
utility location, interior access control, and the appreciation
in parts of the land as a consequence of developing other
parts. The effective access to the industrial land and the
west residential land is emasculated by loss of all 2100
South access in the expropriation. The property is left with
side and rear doors only. SOLOMON and KIEPE were
specific in their judgment of the damage from the deprivation of access. Two pieces of the remainder land (4 acres
formerly industrial on the east of the "take" and 26 acres
of residential on the west) are injured to the point that
their entire use has been changed. There is no possible way
to develop them "after" as "before". The residential land
west of the freeway, whereas "before" appurtenant to the
whole, is "after" in a cell, a new neighborhood, and obliged
to sell as a segregated parcel. And the Decker Pond area,
previously susceptible to being drained, filled and developed
only because it was an integral part of the total residential
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area, is divorced forever from over 170 acres to the west,
which would have otherwise benefitted by the improvement
of the pond and would have withstood some of the development costs. And on further the sterilizing affects of the
"taking" were extended, viz., proximity to the freeway,
noise, odors, and a 3 to 4 year delay in construction of the
roadway.
The balance of the aftermath of the "taking" is axiomatic : the willing buyer, informed as we assume he is on
the disadvantages of the remainder lands described-above
and as set out unequivocally in the testimony at trial, simply
would not begin to pay that price, after condemnation, for
the isolated tracts in their then condition as he would have
paid for the same ground, before condemnation, when the
land was all one unit. Therein lies one of the three keys to
the inadequate condemnation award, upon which a new
trial is herein urged.
By calculation and deduction from the interrogatories
returned, the jury found that the remaining 848 acres had
had been damaged $41,576.00.3 In terms of the jury's own
interrogatories, the Defendant's remaining land was damaged but two percent of its former value as a result of the
"taking" and the construction of the freeway as contemplated.4 Such a finding is unworthy of belief, as a matter
of fundamental justice and law.
3

Under Interrogatory 4, value of land "taken" was answered $318,301.00. The total award under Interrogatory 3 (difference of "before" & "after") was $359,877.00. Difference between 3 and 4, or
$41,576.00, is severance damage.
4
$41,576.00 is approximately 2% of the "before" value of the total
tract, less the value attributable to the land actually "taken".
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That finding of severance damage was less by $210,135.00 the judgment of FRANCIS SOLOMON and $267,544.00 less than the opinion of WERNER KIEPE on damage and injury to the remainder tracts. Such finding is
$23,975.00 above the opinion of the State witness, A.B.C.
JOHNS, allowing an off-set for special benefits which he
alleged. Without the benefits deducted, the jury finding on
severance damage is $2,607.00 less than JOHNS. (See Point
III of this Brief.) Of course, State witness FLETCHER
said that the remaining land was equally valuable "after"
as it was "before" the "taking", i.e., no severance damage.
The second key in this Point on Appeal centers on Interrogatories 1, 2 and 3 answered by the jury on the market value of the property "before" and "after" the "taking"
(R. 53), and the testimony of the leading witnesses on the
same factors.
Interrogatory 1 asked as to the market value of the
total tract before the "taking". It was returned in the sum
of $2,775,911.00 by the jury. It was on this interrogatory
that all other interrogatories depended. That answer was
not only $393,740.00 below the informed judgment of C.
FRANCIS SOLOMON ("before" value — $3,169,651.00)
and $673,009.00 lower than that of WERNER KIEPE ("before" value — $3,448,920.00) on the market value of the
total tract prior to condemnation, BUT IT WAS IN FACT,
$106,709.00 BELOW THAT OPINION OF THE STATE
WITNESS, FLETCHER ("before" value — $2,882,620.00).
There was only one value witness whose opinion prevented
the answer to Interrogatory 1 from being completely without the scope of all testimony, much less believable testi-
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mony, and that was A.B.C. JOHNS, JR. ("before" value —
$2,441,591.00). And JOHNS is the witness, who on the
"before" value of the total tract, was 40% to 80% lower
on his industrial values than any of the other 4 experts, and
800% to 1100% lower than any others on the residential
section of the remainder, through which the "taking"
courses. (See table on page 26 of this Brief; Appx. 1-5.)
His opinion on the market value of that residential area
was $177.00 per acre, a conclusion so incredulous that it
offends and violates all rational thought. Yet without
JOHNS, the answer to Interrogatory 1 would be contrary
to law. Weber Basin Conservancy Dist. v. Moore, 2 U. 2d
254,272 P. 2d 176 (1954).
The third key that the award was grossly inadequate
is Interrogatory 3, defined by the trial Court to be Just
Compensation in the case, and answered by the jury in the
sum of $359,877.00. That answer, which is the inadequate
award, is precisely
$200,123.00 less than the judgment of Mr. SOLOMON, the lowest witness for the Defendant,
and
$315,293.00 lower than the judgment of Mr.
KIEPE.
The answer was $27,757.00 above the high witness for the
State, FLETCHER (who did not have any severance damage), and as stated, $200,123.00 below the lowest witness
for the landowner.
But what of the witnesses and the weight to be reasonably accorded their testimony. SOLOMON and KIEPE
stand heads and shoulders above all other witnesses in this
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suit, particularly A.B.C. JOHNS, JR. Engaged in appraisal
practice in Salt Lake County for more than 25 years, Solomon 37 years, they are the two most notable appraisers in
the State. Their work over the past decades, the bulk of it
for condemning agencies and a substantial part of it for the
State Road Commission, itself, has involved the most complicated and significant land condemnation suits in the
State. The background, experience, training, seasoning,
clientele, work as university lecturers, publication writing,
and the professional activities of Mr. SOLOMON and Mr.
KIEPE, are completely mismatched when stacked against
the paucity of qualifications of Mr. JOHNS, upon whose
opinion the award in this case hangs.
A member of the M A I association and in practice
as an appraiser for 3 years, JOHNS named the State Road
Commission as his primary client (Tr. 760-764). His ineptness and lack of experience were borne out by his lack of
judgment on the value of the total tract "before". Again
and again on cross examination, his typed answer was that
although a certain factor could be detrimental to the remainder lands and would be considered by the informed
buyer and seller, he was not going to recognize it in his appraisal. He was a first rate advocate in the suit. To say
that the award herein is based on the testimony of A.B.C.
JOHNS, JR. is to say nothing, because that opinion is so
frail, absurd and wrought with inconsistencies that it is beyond the realm of being worthy of belief. It is insufficient
to support the award.
It is these stark facts under the interrogatories of the
jury (an unsupported and inadequate value of the whole
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tract before the "taking", severance damage of two per
cent, and the inferiority of the award) when examined in
the light of the overwhelming force of the testimony opposing such results, that brings this case within the framework of Bodon V. Suhrmann, supra, and Lund v. Phillips,
supra. The award herein is so out of harmony with any
reasonable assessment of damages and compensation, and
so shocking to the ordinary sense of fairness and justice,
to impell the inference that the interrogatories were conceived through gross error, misunderstanding, bias and/or
prejudice.
A new trial should be ordered to correct the inadequacy and injustice.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED PREJUDICIALLY
IN REFUSING TO PERMIT COUNSEL FOR
DEFENDANT T O CROSS-EXAMINE T H E
STATE WITNESS, A.B.C. JOHNS, AS TO HIS
PRIOR APPRAISAL OF THE CONDAS PROPERTY NEXT DOOR.
1. It was error to deny cross-examination on the
Condas appraisal.
It was in the late stages of the trial, on cross-examination of the State witness, A.B.C. JOHNS, JR., that the
lower Court committed reversible error. JOHNS had given
his opinion on direct examination as to the fair market
value of the total property before the "taking". (Tr. 800804) Part of such opinion included a finding that the in-
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dustrial property of Defendant abutting upon and having
direct access to 2100 South Street was worth $4,000.00 per
acre. (Ex. P-14, Appx. 5 herein.) Also, he allowed that
Defendant's industrial land on Redwood Road would sell for
$5,200.00 per acre as of the date of "taking". (Ibid.) The
property of one Condas abutted immediately upon the
claimed $4,000.00 an acre industrial land on 21st South.
On cross-examination a foundation was laid and JOHNS
admitted that the Condas' property abutted on 2100 South,
that it was zoned the same as subject property, that it was
adjacent to the Defendant's land prior to condemnation,
and that he had made a previous appraisal of the Condas
industrial land for the landowner. (Tr. 828, 842) It was
abundantly clear at this hour of the trial that the Condas
property, in terms of location, zoning, size, access and use,
was much the more comparable than most of the sales data
upon which JOHNS' testimony was reliant. (Ex. P - l l , Tr.
775-782.)
The question was put to the witness by Defendant's
counsel as to whether on that previous appraisal had he
not determined the Condas property to be worth $10,000.00
per acre?
"MR. CAMPBELL: I have the right, I think, to
state my question — that you appraised that Condas
piece for the landmvner for $10,000.00 an acre?"
An objection was made on grounds of immateriality
and sustained by the trial judge. In so doing, the Court inferred that he understood the question to ask for the "price"
paid to the abutting property owner by the State in the
Condas condemnation proceeding, for it charged the jury
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that it was to "disregard" the testimony with respect to the
"price of the abutting property". (Tr. 843) It also admonished the panel that while this question might be a proper
exercise of cross-examination, the Court was of the judgment that the value of the question was "outweighed by
the risks . . . involved in introducing other issues" which
time would not permit. (Tr. 844)
Two things are pointedly evident in this examination.
The first is that the question did not ask for the price which
the State Road Commission had paid for the Condas property, it did not ask for the amount of severance damages
paid to Condas by the State, and it did not ask the price
which Condas had been offered by the State for his land.
Each of the foregoing would have been improper and no
one was better apprised of the same than Defendant's
counsel. State Road Comm. V. Christensen, 13 U. 2d 224,
371 P. 2d 552 (1962). But the question did not call for
such. Rather, it was directed to the appraisal which JOHNS
had made of the Condas property. It was asked not to establish market value, but to impeach the credibility and
consistency of JOHNS' opinion in this case. That fact could
not be clearer.
The second thing is that it was error of the trial Court
to reject the question, for in so doing, it denied to Defendant's counsel a fundamental purpose of cross-examination
— that of exposing the fraud, the liar, the cheat, the inconsistency of a witness and his bias, prejudice and advocacy.
This Court put the principle well in State of Utah V. Peek,
1 U. 2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630 (1953), when it held:
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"There is no other instrument so well adapted
to discovery of the truth as cross-examination, and
as long as it tends to disclose the truth, it should
never be curtailed or limited. Any inquiry should
be allowed which an individual about to buy would
feel it in his interests to make." (Emphasis added.)
There is no tool in the trial process that can be substituted in place of cross-examination. It is "the detective of
the court-room". Jensen V. S. H. Kress & Co., 87 Utah 434,
49 P. 2d 958 (1935). Text authorities on the cross-examination of an expert witness demonstrate the fallacy of the
lower Court's ruling in this case:
"Of course, a witness who expresses an opinion
as an expert may be impeached by proof that he
has formerly expressed an opinion which appears to
be inconsistent with his testimony." Jones on Evidence, Vol. IV, p. 1768, Sec. 939 (5th Ed.).
Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. Ill, p. 733, Sec. 1041 (3rd Ed.)
states the rule:
"All courts, however, concede that expert opinions as well as other opinions ordinarily admissible,
if inconsistent with those expressed on the stand,
are receivable."
Nichols on Eminent Domain, Vol. 5, p. 274, Sec. 18.45(2)
provides that with respect to the cross-examination of an
expert witness in an eminent domain trial:
"The opinion of a witness may be impeached by
showing that his acts are inconsistent with his
words, as for example by showing that he has offered the same or similar property for sale at a price
far different from what he now says it is worth,
or he may be asked whether he has not made incon-
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sistent statements upon the same point upon other
occasions. * * *
"He may be questioned as to his appraisals of
other property in the area which he has made but
only if the foundation has been laid for a comparison of the different tracts appraised/' (Emphasis
ours.)
The case of Bingaman v. City of Seattle, 139 Wash. 68,
245 Pac. 411 (1926) is clear authority for the rule applicable to the cross-examination of JOHNS. Therein, the
Washington Supreme Court found prejudicial error in the
refusal to permit cross-examination in a condemnation suit,
on a prior inconsistent opinion given by the expert witness
on the value of neighboring land:
"Of the trial errors assigned necessary to be
noticed, the first is the contention that the trial
court too narrowly restricted the cross-examination
of certain of the city's witnesses. One of them, testifying to values, had testified in a case between
other parties in which he had placed values on
neighgoring property largely in excess of the values
he placed on the appellant's property. The appellant
on his cross-examination sought to show this fact,
but was denied the right so to do by the court. It
is our opinion the testimony should have been admitted. There was no great dissimilarity in the situation or in the condition of the properties, nor was
the time so remote as to raise a conclusive presumption that there had been any considerable change
in values. The evidence was thus admissible as
tending to affect the weight to be given to the witnesses' testimony." (Emphasis added)
It was held in Contra Costa County v. East Bay Municipal Dist., 1 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1960) to be proper cross-exam-
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ination of a land expert to permit impeachment on the fact
"that in another case the expert had expressed a markedly
different opinion as to the value of comparable property."
The California Court said:
' T h e ruling of the Court was correct. It is
hornbook law that a witness may be impeached by
prior inconsistent statements. When an expert gives
testimony as to the value of land, he states, under
oath, that his opinion is in fact what he says it is.
Any experienced trial lawyer knows how difficult
it is to show, either that it is not in fact his opinion
or that if it is really his opinion, it is not soundly
based. It is no doubt for this reason that wide latitude is permitted in cross-examination.
"If the facts are such that the other property
can fairly be said to be comparable, and if the difference in time is not great enough to make the two
opinions not really inconsistent, the testimony as to
the witness' own evaluation of the other property is
clearly within the bounds of proper impeachment"
(Emphasis ours)
2. The error committed on the JOHNS' crossexamination was prejudicial to the Defendant.
To obtain reversal, it is not enough to show that the
lower Court erred at some point in the trial. State Road
Comm. V. Peterson, 12 U. 2d 317, 366 P. 2d 76 (1961);
Hales V. Peterson, 11 U. 2d 411, 360 P. 2d 822 (1961). The
error must be such that it may have substantially affected
the outcome of the case. State Road Comm. V. Noble, 6 U.
2d 40, 305 P. 2d 495 (1957). But such being evidenced, a
new trial will be ordered. Board of Education v. Bothwell
& Swaner, 16 U. 2d 341, 400 P. 2d 568 (1965).
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On the general subject of prejudice ensuing from the
refusal to permit cross-examination, Harlan Fisk Stone, in
Alford v. United States, 282 U. S. 687, 75 L. Ed. 625
(1930), said:
"Cross-examination of a witness is a matter of
right. (Citing authorities.) Its permissible purposes, among others, are that facts may be brought
out tending to discredit the witness by showing that
his testimony in chief was untrue or biased. (Citing authorities.) * * * Prejudice ensues from
a denial of the opportunity to place the witness in
his proper setting and put the weight of his testimony and his credibility to a test without which the
jury cannot fully appraise them. (Citing authorities.) "
In Basch v. Iowa Power and Light Co., 95 N. W. 2d
714 (Iowa 1959), it was held to be prejudicial error to do
as the lower Court did in the case at hand, refuse to permit
cross-examination of an expert witness in a condemnation
trial on a previous opinion he had expressed as to adjacent
properties:
"The sustaining of the objection to the other
three questions ivas reversible error. By so ruling
the court denied defendant the right to show prior
inconsistent statements and actions of the witness
which would bear directly on the weight and credit
to be given to his testimony in chief. This court in
State v. Matheson, 130 Iowa 440, at page 448, 103
N. W. 137, at page 140, states the rule as follows :
" 'But the great weight of authority seems
to support the proposition that if there is an
inconsistency between the belief of the witness,
as indicated by his previous declarations, and
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that which would naturally be indicated by his
examination in chief, such previous declarations
may be shown, although they are not directly
contradictory to any specific statement made on
his examination in chief/ (Citing eases.)"
The same evidentiary principle was applied in People
V. Murata, 326 P. 2d 947 (Cal. 1958) under slightly different facts. There, the cross-examiner had asked the witness
about an earlier appraisal he had made of the condemned
property in 1954 for $1,500.00 per acre. His opinion at trial
in 1956 ranged between $10,000.00 to $43,000.00 an acre.
The trial Court sustained an objection to the cross-examination, stating:
"You are going to get into collateral matters
which can be extremely serious here. I am confident
you have gone as far as you can."
On appeal, it was determined that the exclusionary ruling
constituted reversible error:
"We conclude that this ruling operated unduly
to restrict the cross-examination. It is well settled
that 'the value of the opinion evidence of a witness
may be tested by showing that upon a former occasion he expressed a different opinion, or made statements inconsistent with the opinion expressed/ 26
Cal. Jur. 155, §128."
Counsel for the State argued before the trial Court
herein that the refusal to permit cross-examination of
JOHNS on the Condas appraisal was within the discretion
of the trial judge and was not error, since the question involved the collateral matter of impeachment. Murata, supra, Basch V. Iowa Poiver and Light Co., supra, the Bing-
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aman case and others cited herein are a ready answer to
the contention that the denial of cross-examination was discretionary with the trial Court, and State V. Peek, 1 U. 2d
263, 265 P. 2d 630 (1953) and Alford V. U. S., supra, closes
the argument that impeachment examination is a collateral
matter from which prejudice does not ensue.
The prejudice flowing from the trial Court's ruling
herein is easily spotted. Appearing as the last value witness
in the trial and as the first appraiser who had made a radical departure from all the other witnesses on the value of
the north industrial land of Defendant prior to the "taking", (P. 26 this Brief, Appx. 1-5), JOHNS in flippant and
staccato style, gave his opinion on the value of the total
tract "before". (Tr. 799, Ex. P-14) The man's finding was
$728,060.00 belotv the "before" value of FRANCIS SOLOMON and $441,020.00 lower than the other State witness,
R. S. FLETCHER.
The result was astonishing and it
changed the entire atmosphere of the trial. His opinion was
so far out of line with even the simple average values of the
others that either he was right, in which case the other 4
witnesses were totally wrong, or JOHNS was, himself,
grossly misinformed, or he was a fraud, or an advocate for
his client, or a combination of the three. And so cross-examination commenced with this witness after a week and
one-half of trial with the cards all on the table face up and
with Defendant's counsel assigned the task of finding out
which of these alternatives was correct. It tvas the pivotal
point of the trial
The comparability of the Condas and Taggart properties, lying side by side with similar access and zoning is not
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open to reasonable question, particularly in view of some
of the other sales to which JOHNS had eluded. If JOHNS
had appraised the Condas tract at $10,000.00 per acre at a
previous time for the landowner, and now had appraised
the subject property at $4,000.00 and $2,000.00 an acre
for the State, it would provide the answer to JOHNS' appraisal. It would expose him as a fake, an advocate for his
particular client, and as a witness whose opinion was so
insubstantial that it would be discarded as unworthy of belief. What would be his answer to this all important question?
We don't know. We will never know until a new trial
is ordered because the Court stopped the cross-examination
at this point. The probability is that the answer would have
dealt a devastating blow to the credibility of JOHNS' opinion. And the lower Court made its ruling complete, in addition to sustaining the State's objection, by admonishing
the jury to disregard even the question. (Tr. 844)
The prejudice from this error is revealed in the answer to jury Interrogatory 1, which was answered in the
sum of $2,775,911.00. There is only bne opinion which
would begin to support the lowness of that finding — AND
THAT IS THE TESTIMONY OF A.B.C. JOHNS, JR. The
jury had to give consideration to the JOHNS' appraisal,
for there was no other testimony that would have justified
the paucity of this finding. But for JOHNS' opinion, the
interrogatories as returned, would be subject to an order
of additur or new trial, as a matter of law. Porcupine Reservoir Co, V. Keller Corp., 15 U. 2d 318, 392 P. 2d 620
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(1964); Weber Basin Conservancy Dist. V. Moore, 2 U. 2d
254, 272 P. 2d 176 (1954). Had JOHNS been required to
answer the question on the Condas appraisal, the result in
this case would no doubt have been substantially different.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED PREJUDICIALLY
IN PERMITTING THE QUESTION OF SPECIAL BENEFITS UNDER THE TESTIMONY
OF A.B.C. JOHNS, JR. TO BE CONSIDERED
BY THE JURY.
1. No definition of or foundation for Special
Benefits was made by the State in the testimony
of Johns.
It has been some time since this Court last considered
a case in eminent domain where the issue of special benefits
was squarely raised. The question was touched briefly in
Weber Basin Conservancy Dist. v. Braegger, 8 U. 2d 346,
334 P. 2d 758 (1959). Before that it was in the case of
Cook V. Salt Lake City, et al.} 48 Utah 58, 157 Pac. 643
(1916). Nonetheless, it is clear enough in this jurisdiction
that in an eminent domain suit to establish Just Compensation, benefits from the highway project which specially
improve the value of the Defendant's remainder lands may
be considered by the trier of fact. 78-34-10(4) U.C.A. 1953;5
Kimball v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 253, 90 Pac. 395 (1907) ;
Oregon Shortline V. Fox, 28 Utah 311, 78 Pac. 800 (1904).
5

Although the Statute makes reference to "benefits" only, judicial
construction, in line with the general rule, requires a showing of
special enhancement.
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But there are two conditions to this rule of compensation. One is that the benefits must be special to the remainder property, since general benefits are inadmissible and
irrelevant. Salt Lake U. & R. Co. V. Butterfield, 46 Utah
431, 150 Pac. 931 (1915). The other condition is that a
special benefit is material only to the extent that it off-sets
severance damage to remaining land. It may not be used
to diminish the compensation to which the owner is entitled
for the "taking". 78-34-10 (4) U.C.A. 1953. A sound definition of special vis-a-vis general benefits is set forth in
Hempstead V. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 261, 90 Pac. 397
(1909), as being a special advantage, such as added convenience, accessibility, or new use, accruing as a direct consequence of the public project, contrasted to a general benefit running to the larger community from the public work.
JOHNS failed to define what he meant by a special
benefit. He did not set forth one sale of property which
had been similarly benefitted from a non-access freeway
and he provided not one scintilla of objective data to underlie his claim. All that he said was that the industrial land
remaining west of the freeway was specially benefitted
because of the "arterial interchange" of 1-215 and 2100
South, and that such benefit was $26,582.00.
The Court erred in permitting, over objection of Defendant's counsel, benefits to be at all considered by the
jury. There was not adequate foundation and evidence to
support a finding of the same. Although the factors which
the willing and informed buyer and seller would recognize
should be taken into account, "an opinion based ex-
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clusively upon one factor should be rejected." Nichols on
Eminent Domain, Vol. 5, P. 245, Sec. 18.42(1) (3rd Ed.).
To affirm a jury interrogatory under which special benefits
are submitted, something more than an. unsupported guess
of a witness is necessary.
2. The lower Court erred in refusing to permit
cross-examination of JOHNS on the nature of the
Special Benefits claimed.
JOHNS alleged that the benefits to Defendant's remainder lands emanated from the arterial freeway. Ostensibly, this meant that traffic and activity would be
brought to the area by the freeway that was not theretofore existent. There is no other explanation. On cross-examination, counsel for Defendant inquired of JOHNS as
to whether the traffic that would be placed on the freeway
was not, in fact, the same traffic movement and activity
existent on Redwood Road, at the date of "taking". The
question ran directly to the impeachment and invalidity of
the special benefits argument and was not an attempt to
show damage by virtue of loss of traffic flow on Redwood
Road. The latter is damnum absque injuria, Hislop V.
Weber Basin Conservancy Dist., 12 U. 2d 64, 362 P. 2d 580
(1961); State Road Comm. V. Rozelle, et ux., 101 Utah 464,
120 P. 2d 276 (1942), and no claim was ever made by Defendant at trial for its recovery.
The Court erred in sustaining the objection of immateriality to the question. All factors which the buyer and
seller would reasonably consider in determining special
benefits as well as damages, are properly within the per-
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view of cross-examination. State v. Peek, 1 U. 2d 263, 265
P. 2d 630 (1953); State Road Comm. v. Woolley, 15 U. 2d
167, 397 P. 2d 463 (1964).
POINT IV
THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE LOWER COURT
ON BURDEN OF PROOF AND PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE WERE ERRONEOUS TO
T H E DEFENDANT'S DETRIMENT A N D
PREJUDICE.
1. Instructions 18, 19, and 30 unduly and unfairly
repeated and emphasized the Defendant-landowner's burden of proof and preponderance on the
value of the property, before and after the "taking".
The Court charged the jury that the landowner carried
to the trial the burden of proving, by a fair preponderance
of the evidence, the truth of its contentions on land value
and damages caused by the "taking". Such principle of
evidentiary procedure has been the rule in the conduct of
eminent domain litigation in Utah since early days. Oregon
Shortline R. Co. V. Russell, et al., 27 Utah 457, 76 Pac. 345
(1904); Tanner V. Provo Bench Canal & Irrigation Co., 40
Utah 105, 121 Pac. 584 (1911); State Road Comm. V. Peterson, 12 U. 2d 317, 366 P. 2d 76 (1961). It is a harsh and
unfair rule and should be changed, prospectively. For the
Government to "take" by right of eminent domain a man's
property against his will, and then say to him that he must

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

53
prove its value by the preponderance of evidence, imposes
an unreasonable and often severe burden upon the citizen.6
It was not the adoption of the rule by the trial Court,
however, that constituted prejudicial error in this case.
Rather, it was the manner in which the rule was used in the
charge to the jury that created the prejudice to Defendant.
Both Instructions 18 and 19 of the Court focus on the same
subject matter—burden of proof and preponderance of the
evidence. Each declares the burden is on the landowner to
prove land value and damages by the "preponderance of the
evidence". Each defines the quality of evidence necessary
to preponderate and each charges the jury to find against
the Defendant if the preponderance test is not satisfied.
Number 18 states:
"You are instructed that the burden of proving
the value of the land being acquired by the State of
Utah and the burden of proving damages, if any,
to the remaining lands are burdens which the law
places upon the defendants. These burdens of proof
are successfully carried by defendants only if you
find that they have established the truth of their
contentions by the preponderance of the evidence. A
"preponderance of the evidence" is defined as the
amount of evidence which is more convincing as to
its truth, or which convinces the mind of the jury
that a proposition is more probably true than not
true. //, in your deliberations, you believe that the
evidence introduced by both parties as to the land
6

In a number of jurisdictions, the burden is placed on the condemnor
to prove the value of the "taking". See discussion in 5 Nichols on
Eminent Domain 300 #18.5 (3rd Ed.). If the landowner contends
that his remaining property is damaged by the "taking", he should,
in all events, have the burden of proof on that issue.
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taken and the damages, if any, to the remaining
lands is evenly balanced then you will reject the
contentions advanced by the defendants." (R. 41)
(Emphasis ours)
The pertinent sections of Instruction 19 are:
"Whenever in these instructions I state that the
"burden" or "burden of proof" rests or is placed
upon a certain party to prove the existence of a certain fact, the meaning of such instruction is this:
That unless the party with whom the burden of
proof rests proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, the truthfulness of the alleged fact you shall
find against such party in your determination of
such fact. Specifically, if the defendant landowners
fail to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the
truthfulness of the facts which they allege, you shall
find against the defendant landoivners in your deliberation of such fact. (Emphasis added)
"The term "preponderance of the evidence"
does not mean the greater number of witnesses nor
the sheer amount of testimony adduced . . ." (R. 42)
Instruction 30 then again affirms that the Defendant
carries the burden of proof by the preponderance, but in
addition, charges that the Defendant has an extra burden
. . . the amount of compensation:
"INSTRUCTION NO. 30
In making your findings of fact you should bear in
mind that the burden of proving the amount of compensation to which defendants are entitled is upon
the defendants, and the defendants must prove it
by a preponderance of the evidence."
This was the same sheet of paper which contained the
special interrogatories and answer blanks for the jury. The
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foreman also signed at the bottom of it upon the jury's
return.
While repetitive and cumulative instructions to a jury
on a particular point do not necessarily constitute reversible
error, they are not favored. Taylor v. Johnson, 15 U. 2d
342, 393 P. 2d 382 (1964). Where the cumulation is not
merely redundent, and where the repetition is directed to
material and substantive factors in the suit, the error is
prejudicial. Taylor V. Johnson, supra. The reason is that
it emphasizes and fixes unfairly and unreasonably in the
minds of the jury the matter which is repeated. Three times
in the space of 30 short instructions the jury in the case
at Bar was charged on the necessity of Defendant meeting
its burden of proof. It is fair to assume that the jurors
could have been, due to the emphasis and repetition, under
the impression that the Defendant bore an overwhelming
burden and obligation to prove its case in chief, rather than
fixing their attention on what the believable evidence
showed to be the truth in the cause.
Instruction 30, in itself, is wholly erroneous in its statement that Defendant has the burden of proving "the amount
of compensation''. While the burden of proof placed on the
Defendant extends to the value of the "taking" and to damages to the remaining lands, it does not require proof of
special benefits, or the lack thereof. That burden rests with
the condemnor. Tanner V. Provo Bench Canal & Irr, Co.,
40 Utah 105, 121 Pac. 584 (1911). The charge, however,
as given to the jury, obligates the landowner, in "proving
the amount of compensation", to also prove the absence of
special benefits.
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The harmful effect of the three burden of proof instructions, 18, 19 and 30, constitutes prejudicial error.
2. Instructions 18 and 19 are further erroneous,
for they direct a verdict against Defendant-landowner if the latter does not meet its full preponderance.
Instruction 18 charges the jury:
"If in your deliberations, you believe that the evidence introduced by both parties as to land taken
and the damages, if any, to the remaining lands is
evenly balanced, you shall reject the contentions
advanced by the Defendants"
(R. 41)
Instruction 19 is similar in its statement that if the landowner fails to prove its case by a preponderance:
"you shall find against the defendant landowners
in your deliberation of such fact." (R. 42)
The trouble with both Instructions is that it gives the
jury no choice in considering the testimony and evidence
of the Defendant. Under such Instruction, if the Defendant
satisfies its burden of proof, the interrogatories would be
answered in accordance with the landowner's evidence. But
if the Defendant does not fulfill its total burden, then the
Instructions direct the jury to "find against and reject the
contentions of the landowners". The jury must have some
opinion evidence upon which to return its verdict and since,
with the landowner's evidence gone, there is no evidence
left other than that of the State, the Instructions, by implication, direct the jury to accept the State's testimony. For
all practical purposes, that is just what the jury did by its
answers to interrogatories.
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The Court did not instruct as it should have, that if
the preponderance of the testimony and evidence was less
than the value conclusions of the Defendant but more than
the value conclusions of the Plaintiff, the interrogatories
could be answered within that range of the testimony where
the weight fairly preponderated.
Both Instructions 18 and 19 are framed with the typical contract or negligence suit in mind. They are inapplicable and erroneous in an eminent domain trial on Just Compensation. This Court has before made its record on the
point that an instruction which specifically or by inference
directs the jury to find certain material facts, is erroneous
and prejudicial. Valiotis v. Utah-Apex Mining Co., 55 Utah
151, 184 Pac. 802 (1919). Instructions 18 and 19 fit within
the qualifications of that rule.

CONCLUSION
There is simply no way to get around the hard fact
that the interrogatories returned by the jury are in violation of the great and clear weight of the testimony on the
market value of the property, before and after the "taking".
Such answers do not begin to represent any reasonable appraisal of the land value and damages under the test in
Bodon V. Suhrmann, 8 U 2d 42, 327 P. 2d 826 (1958), because there is no substantial and believable evidence to
support them. The trial Court should have ordered a new
trial on the basis of inadequacy of the award, their being
no substantial and believable evidence to support it.
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The trial Court committed reversible error in refusing
to allow, at the key point of the trial, cross-examination by
Defendant's counsel of A.B.C. JOHNS, JR., State witness,
on his appraisal of the neighboring Condas property; and
in permitting the question of special benefits, under the
testimony of JOHNS, to go to the jury. It further committed prejudicial error, to the detriment of Defendant, in
Instructions 18, 19, and 30, with respect to the nature of
Defendant's burden of proof in the case.
Truth and justice did not prevail in the lower Court.
A new trial on Just Compensation should be ordered, it is
respectfully submitted.
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR.
of
PARSONS, BEHLE, EVANS &
LATIMER
520 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant
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APPENDIX 1
APPRAISAL OF
C. FRANCIS SOLOMON — M.A.I.
(926.7 Acres) Value of Entire Property BEFORE Condemnation
Zone

Acreage

MUL

Value per Acre Value

2&5
25.-2100 So.
180.-balance

M-2

10,-East
29.8-bal.

C-2

$5,500.00

$156,750.00

5,500.00
4,235.00

137,500.00
764,920.00

To

10,000.00
6,000.00

100,000.00
178,800.00

Value
Before

R-5

119.8

3,500.00

419,300.00

X5

601

4,500.00

270,450.00

A-l

7.0

2,328.00

16,296.00

Unzoned

35.-3100 So.
430.9-bal.

TOTALS

926.7

*al

$3,169,651.00

3,500.00
122,500.00
2,328.00 1,003,135.00
$3,169,651.00

(848.59 Acres) Value of Remaining Property AFTER Condemnation
Zone

Acreage

M-l

28.5

Value per Acre Value

80 0

M-2

76.0

$5,000.00
2,541.00
4,235.00

$142,500.00
Remaining
531,561.00

C-2

39.8

R-5

119.8

3,500.00

419,300.00

A-2

60.1

4,050.00

243,405.00

A-l

7.0

2,328.00

16,296.00

2,170.00
1,400.00
2,049.00
2,328.00
3,500.00

258,587.00
29,960.00
94,049.00
476,308.00
119,000.00
$2,609,766.00

Unzoned*
TOTALS

119.-W. of P.L.
21.4-E " W.F/W
45.9-E. F / W
204.5 "
34.0-3100 So.
848.59

No damage 278,800.00

Value
After
$2,609,766.00

D I F F E R E N C E IN BEFORE AND AFTER (Rounded)...$560,000.00
Value of land Condemned: Industrial-49.11 Acres
Residential-29.00 Acres
Severance Damage
TOTAL OPINION

$239,605.00
68,684.00
251,711.00
$560,000.00

*P.L. = Pole Line; F / W = Free Way. E. "W.F/W = East of Pole
Line & West of Free Way.
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APPENDIX 2
APPRAISAL OF
W E R N E R K I E P E — M.A.I.
(926.7 Acres) Value of Entire Property BEFORE Condemnation
Zone

Acreage

Value per Acre Value

103' x 330'
M-l

$ 100.00 $ 10,300.00
F/F
4,000.00
110,880.00

27.72
70.0 W. of P/L
135.6 E. of P / L

M-2
~

1600' x 330'

C-2

27.68
1400' x 330'

5,500.00
6,500.00

385,000.00
881,400.00

120.00
F/F
5,000.00

192,000.00

75.00
F/F
4,500.00

105,000.00
491,355.00

Before

109.19

A^l

7X)

750.00

5,250.00

60.1

6,000.00

360,600.00

465.9
926.7

1,650.00

768,735.00
$3,448,920.00

A-2

Value

138,400.00

R-5

Unzoned
TOTALS

Total

$3,448,920.00

:

(848.59 Acres) Value of Remaining Property A F T E R Condemnation
Zone

Acreage

M-l

28.5

M-2

C-2
R^5

Value per Acre Value
Same as Before

$121,180.00

34.12 E. of F / W $5,000.00
52.58 W. of F / W
& E. of P.L.
4,500.00
70.0 W. of P.L.
5,500.00
1600' x 330'
100.00
F/F
27.68 (rear)
4,500.00
119.8
Same as Before

170,600.00
236,610.00
385,000.00
160,000.00

7.0

Same as Before

5,250.00

A-2

60.1

Same as Before

360,600.00

Unzoned
TOTALS

Value
After

124,560.00
596,355.00

A-l

119.0 W. of P.L.
26.9 E. of P.L.
& W. of F / W
290.79 E. of F / W
848.59

_
. .
Remaining

1,500.00

178,500.00

500.00
1,450.00

13,450.00
421,645.00
$2,773,750.00

$2,773,750.00

D I F F E R E N C E IN BEFORE AND A F T E R T

$675,170.00

Value of land Condemned: Industrial-48.9 Acres
Residential-29.00 Acres
Severance Damage

$317,850.00
48,197.00
309,120.00

TOTAL OPINION

$675,170.00
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APPENDIX 3
APPRAISAL OF
MAXWELL S. LOLL — A.S.A.
(926.7 Acres) Value of Entire Property BEFORE Condemnation
Acreage

Zone
M-l

28.5

M-2

205.6

C-2

Value per Acre Value
$5,500.00

$156,750.00

5,500.00 1,130,800.00

Total

39.8

6,800.00

270,640.00

Value
Before

67.1

3,000.00

201,300.00

R-5

119.8

3,000.00

359,400.00

Unzoned

465.9

3,000.00 1,397,700.00

TOTALS

926.7

$3,516,590.00

A-2-1

(848.59 Acres) Value of Remaining Property AFTER Condemnation
Zone

Acreage

M-l

28.5

$5,500.00

$156,750.00

M-2

33.09
46.70
76.70

5,500.00
4,350.00
4,200.00

181,995.00
203,145.00
322,140.00

C-2

39.8

6,800.00

270,640 00

R-5

119.8

3,000.00

359,400.00

67.1

3,000.00

201,300.00

3,000.00
1,000.00
2,000.00

905,700.00
27,000.00
216,000.00

A-2-1

Value per Acre Value

E. of F / W * * 301.9
P.L.* & F / W 27.
Unzoned W. of P.L. 108.
TOTALS
** Free way

848.59

Remaining
Value
After
$2,844,070.00

$2,844,070.00
*Pole Line

D I F F E R E N C E IN BEFORE AND AFTER
Value of land Condemned: Industrial-49.11 Acres
Residential-29.00 Acres
Severance Damage
TOTAL OPINION

$672,520.00
$270,105.00
87,000.00
315,415.00
$672,520.00
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APPENDIX 4
R. S. F L E T C H E R — APPRAISER
VALUE BEFORE TAKING
Land
Type

Acreage

Total
Value per Acre Value

21st South:
Front 1320'
Rear 1320'

69.06
136.54

Redwood:
Front 1320'
Rear 1320'

9.56
18.94

6,000.00
5,000.00

57,360.00
94,700.00

Redwood C-2

39.80

10,000.00

398,000.00

Redwood A-2
Redwood A-l

60.10
7.00

4,500.00
3,000.00

270,450.00
21,000.00

Redwood R-5 119.80

4,000.00

479,200.00

Unzoned:
Lake
Balance

180.00
285.90

200.00
1,500.00

36,000.00
428,850.00

TOTALS

926.70

$6,000.00 $414,360.00
5,000.00 682,700.00

12,882,620.00
VALUE A F T E R TAJQNG

Land
Type

Acreage

Total
Value per Acre Value

21st South:
Front 1320'
Rear 1320'

25.99
130.50

Redwood:
Front 1320'
Rear 1320'

9.56
18.94

6,000.00
5,000.00

57,360.00
94,700.00

Redwood C-2

39.80

10,000.00

398,000.00

Redwood A-2

60.10

4,500.00

270,450.00

Redwood A-l

$6,000.00 $155,940.00
5,000.00 652,500.00

7.00

3,000.00

21,000.00

Redwood R-5 119.80

4,000.00

479,200.00

Unzoned:
Lake
Balance

180.00
256.90

200.00
1,500.00

36,000.00
385,350.00

TOTALS

848.59

$2,550,500.00

DIFFERENCE

$ 332,120.00

VALUE OF LAND T A K E N
Land
Type

Acreage

Total
Value per Acre Value

21st South:
Front 1320' 43.07
$6,000.00 $258,420.00
Rear 1320'
6.04
5,000.00
30,200.00
Unzoned:
(Balance)
29.00
1,500.00
43,500.00
TOTALS
7 8 l W.
i Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School,
$ 332,120.00
Digitized
by the Howard
BYU.
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DAMAGES
TO REMAINDER

NONE

APPENDIX 5
A. B. C. J O H N S — APPRAISER
VALUE BEFORE TAKING
Land
Total
Type
Acreage
Value per Acre Value
M-l
21st So. Fr.
69.06
$4,000.00 $276,240.00
21st So. Rear 136.54
2,300.00
314,042.00
(Fr. 9.56
5,200.00
49,712.00
Redwood (R. 18.94
3,000.00
56,820.0$
Unzoned
W / o Lake
275.90
1,725.00 475,927.00
Unzoned
Lake
190.00
177.00
33,630.00
C-2
39.80
10,580.00 421,084.00
A-2
60.10
4,356.00 261,795.00
A-l
7!0
4,356.00
30,492.00
R-5
119.80
4,356.00
521,849.00
TOTALS
926.7
$2,441,591.00
VALUE AFTER TAKING
Land
Total
Type
Acreage
Value per Acre Value
21st So. Fr.
25\99
$2,300.00 $ 59,777.00
21st So. Rear 130.71
2,300.00
300,633.00
(Fr. 9.56
5,200.00
49,712.00
Redwood (R. 18.94
3,000.00
56,820.00
Unzoned
W / o Lake
246.69
1,725.00 425,540.00
Unzoned
Lake
190.00
177.00
33,630.00
C-2
39.80
10,580.00
421,084.00
Other (A-2,
A-l, R-5)
186.90
4,356.00
814,136.00
TOTALS
848.59
$2,161,332.00
DIFFERENCE
$ 280,259.00
VALUE OF LAND T A K E N
Land
Total
Type
Acreage
Value per Acre Value
21st So. Fr.
M-l, M-2
43.07
$4,000.00 $172,280.00
21st So. Rear
M-2
5^83
2,300.00
13,409.00
Unzoned
29.21
1,725.00
50,387.00
TOTALS
78.11
$ 236,076.00
DAMAGES TO R E M A I N D E R
Land
Total
Type
Acreage
Value per Acre Value
21st So. Fr.
M-l, M-2
25.99
$1,700.00 $ 44,183.00
TOTALS
25.99
$ 44,183.00
SPECIAL B E N E F I T S TO R E M A I N D E R
Land
Total
Type
Acreage
Value per Acre Value
21st So.
M-l, M-2
46.23
$ 575.00 $ 26,582.00
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
TOTALS
46.23
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors. —$ 26,582.00
Net Damages to Remainder
$ 17,601.00
Value of land taken
236,076.00
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